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ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
    In this case, we address an emerging trend in the 
brokerage industry.  Ordinarily, broker-dealers, as members 
of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),1 are 
required by FINRA Rule 12200 to arbitrate all claims brought 
against them by a customer.  Seeking to avoid this obligation 
to arbitrate, broker-dealers have begun inserting forum-
selection clauses in their customer agreements, without 
mentioning the customer’s right to arbitrate.  This practice, 
which has been condoned by several of our sister circuits, 
deprives investors of the benefits associated with using 
FINRA’s arbitral forum to resolve brokerage-related disputes.  
    
This case concerns such a forum-selection clause.  
Over the course of several years, Bear Stearns & Co., now 
known as J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (hereinafter J.P. 
Morgan), a broker-dealer and FINRA member, executed 
several broker-dealer agreements with Reading Health 
System.  The agreements were executed in connection with 
four separate offerings of auction rate securities (ARS), 
through which Reading issued more than $500 million in 
debt.2  Two of those contracts included forum-selection 
                                              
1 FINRA is a self-regulatory organization (SRO) that is 
statutorily authorized “to exercise comprehensive oversight 
over all securities firms that do business with the public.”  
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 737 
(9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 In simplified terms, ARS are long-term bonds (or 
preferred securities) that pay either interest or dividends to the 
bondholders at rates set by periodically held “Dutch” 
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clauses providing that “all actions and proceedings arising out 
of” the agreements or underlying ARS transactions had to be 
filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York.   
 
After the ARS market collapsed, Reading filed a 
statement of claim with FINRA, alleging that J.P. Morgan 
engaged in unlawful conduct in connection with the ARS 
offerings and demanding that those claims be resolved 
through FINRA arbitration.  J.P. Morgan refused to arbitrate, 
however, contending that Reading had waived its right to 
arbitrate by agreeing to the forum-selection clauses.  To 
resolve this standoff, Reading filed a declaratory judgment 
action to compel FINRA arbitration in the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In response, J.P. 
Morgan moved to transfer the action to New York, based on 
the forum-selection clauses in some (but not all) of the 
broker-dealer agreements.  The District Court denied the 
motion to transfer the action and ordered J.P. Morgan to 
submit to FINRA arbitration.  We will affirm both rulings.   
 
BACKGROUND 
I. Factual Background 
 Reading is a not-for-profit health system located in 
Berks County, Pennsylvania. Reading issued ARSs on four 
occasions in 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007, offering a total of 
more than $500 million in debt to finance capital projects 
relating to the Reading Hospital and Medical Center Project.  
                                                                                                     
auctions.  See Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 690 
F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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J.P. Morgan served as the underwriter and broker-dealer for 
each offering.  The parties executed separate broker-dealer 
agreements in connection with each of the four ARS 
offerings.   
 
Over time, the ARS offerings did not go as planned for 
Reading.  Reading claims that J.P. Morgan and other broker-
dealers artificially propped up the ARS market through 
undisclosed support bidding that created a false appearance of 
market demand for ARSs.  Allegedly, when the broker-
dealers stopped propping up the market in early 2008, the 
ARS market collapsed.  As a result, Reading filed various 
state law claims against J.P. Morgan relating to the ARS 
offerings and demanded that those claims be arbitrated before 
FINRA.   
 
 This appeal does not require us to examine the 
propriety of J.P. Morgan’s handling of the ARS offerings or 
to apportion fault for the collapse of the ARS market.  Rather, 
we are asked to resolve only the parties’ threshold disputes 
regarding the proper venue in which to adjudicate Reading’s 
action to compel arbitration and the venue for Reading’s 
substantive claims against J.P. Morgan.   
 
 To do so, we must examine the four broker-dealer 
agreements.  Each of the agreements included a New York 
choice-of-law clause.3  Both the 2001 and 2002 broker-dealer 
agreements were executed by J.P. Morgan and Bankers Trust 
(as auction agent); Reading did not sign either agreement.4  
                                              
   3 J.A. 95, 120, 165, 187. 
4 J.A. 154-67 (2001 broker-dealer agreement); 175-88 (2002 
broker-dealer agreement).  
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Neither agreement includes a forum-selection clause.  The 
2005 broker-dealer agreement was executed by Reading 
Health, J.P. Morgan, and Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas.5  The 2007 agreement was executed by the same 
three parties, as well as the Berks County Municipal 
Authority.6  Both the 2005 and 2007 agreements contain a 
forum-selection clause that provides, in relevant part, as 
follows:  
 
The parties agree that all actions and 
proceedings arising out of this Broker-Dealer 
Agreement or any of the transactions 
contemplated hereby shall be brought in the 
United States District Court in the County of 
New York and that, in connection with any such 
action or proceeding, submit to the jurisdiction 
of, and venue in, such court.7  
J.P. Morgan asserts that the forum-selection clauses in these 
agreements required Reading to file both its declaratory 
action to compel arbitration and its substantive claims in the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York.  
                                              
5 J.A. 79-96.   
6 J.A. 106-24. 
7 J.A. 95, 120.  There are distinctions between the two 
clauses that are immaterial to this appeal.  For example, the 
2007 agreement, unlike the 2005 agreement, provides that all 
actions and proceedings shall be “brought in the County of 
New York,” without explicitly referring to federal court.  
Both agreements explicitly provide that the parties waive any 
right to a jury trial but do not mention waiver of the right to 
arbitration.  Id.     
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II. Procedural Background  
In February 2014, Reading filed a statement of claim 
with FINRA, asserting claims against J.P. Morgan relating to 
the ARS offerings and demanding that J.P. Morgan arbitrate 
those claims in FINRA’s arbitral forum.8  That demand was 
made pursuant to FINRA Rule 12200, which requires a 
FINRA member, such as J.P. Morgan, to arbitrate any dispute 
with a customer, such as Reading, at the customer’s request.  
J.P. Morgan refused to arbitrate.  In J.P. Morgan’s view, the 
forum-selection clauses in the 2005 and 2007 broker-dealer 
agreements constituted a waiver of Reading’s right to 
arbitrate under FINRA Rule 12200.9  
 
In March 2015, Reading filed a single-count 
declaratory judgment action in the District Court for Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.10  The following day, Reading 
moved to compel arbitration of the claims it had filed with 
FINRA, arguing that it was entitled to arbitrate those claims 
                                              
8 Reading’s statement of claim pleaded several state law 
causes of action against J.P. Morgan, including fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty and 
other rule-based duties.  J.A. 206-34.   
9 Recognizing that they had reached an impasse, the parties 
agreed to stay the FINRA arbitration pending the Second 
Circuit’s resolution of a near-identical arbitrability issue.  J.A. 
235-36.  As discussed below, the Second Circuit eventually 
endorsed the view that the forum-selection clauses supersede 
the right to arbitrate under FINRA Rule 12200.  See 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Schools Fin. Auth. 
(Golden Empire), 764 F.3d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 2014).    
10 J.A. 13-22.  
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pursuant to FINRA Rule 12200.  Invoking the forum-
selection clauses in the 2005 and 2007 broker-dealer 
agreements, J.P. Morgan filed two motions:  a motion to 
transfer the declaratory judgment action to the Southern 
District of New York and, in the event transfer was denied, a 
cross-motion to enjoin the FINRA arbitration.   
 
In February 2016, the District Court issued a single 
order (i) denying J.P. Morgan’s motion to transfer, (ii) 
granting Reading’s motion to compel, and (iii) denying J.P. 
Morgan’s cross-motion to enjoin.11  The court declined to 
transfer the declaratory judgment action to New York 
because, in its view, the forum-selection clauses did not 
designate the forum in which Reading should seek to compel 
arbitration.  The court then required J.P. Morgan to submit to 
arbitration because it concluded that FINRA Rule 12200 
granted Reading the right to arbitrate; this right was not 
overridden by the forum-selection clauses. 
 
After we dismissed J.P. Morgan’s initial appeal on 
jurisdictional grounds, the District Court granted J.P. 
Morgan’s motion to certify the following question for 
interlocutory review:  
 
[W]hether the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Atlantic Marine Construction 
Company, Inc. v. United States District Court 
for the Western District of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568 
(2013), requires a district court to enforce a 
forum selection clause by transferring a 
declaratory action seeking to compel arbitration, 
                                              
11 J.A. 3-4.    
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even if the district court determines that the 
forum selection clause does not cover the 
underlying arbitration that the plaintiff seeks to 
compel.12  
We then granted J.P. Morgan’s petition for permission to 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  
III. Regulatory Background 
Reading bases its right to arbitrate its disputes with J.P. 
Morgan on FINRA’s compulsory arbitration rule.    
 
FINRA is an independent, self-regulatory organization 
(SRO) established pursuant to Section 15A of the Securities 
Exchange Act, which “created a system of supervised self-
regulation in the securities industry.”13  FINRA is authorized 
to “exercise comprehensive oversight over ‘all securities 
firms that do business with the public,’”14 including J.P. 
Morgan and other broker-dealers that participated in the now-
defunct ARS market.  In its capacity as a securities regulator, 
FINRA has promulgated various rules governing the 
brokerage industry, many of which are designed to protect 
investors who conduct business with FINRA-regulated 
                                              
12 J.A. 5, 348, 350; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
13 Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 
1119, 1128 (9th Cir. 2005).   
14 City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 737 (quoting UBS Fin. Servs., 
Inc. v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 
2011); 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169, 42,170 (Aug. 1, 2007)); see 15 
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (requiring broker-dealers to be FINRA 
members).    
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firms.15  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
which is statutorily authorized to oversee FINRA, must 
approve all such rules.16  A FINRA member agrees to comply 
with all of FINRA’s rules and is thus bound to adhere to 
FINRA’s Code and its relevant arbitration provisions.17 
 
FINRA’s authority includes regulatory oversight over 
securities arbitration.18  Indeed, “[t]he SEC has long viewed 
the option of securities arbitration for investors as an 
                                              
15 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (requiring FINRA to adopt 
rules designed, inter alia, to “prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable 
principles of trade, . . . and, in general, to protect investors 
and the public interest”).   
16 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1)-(2); 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3(a)(12); 
see Amicus Brief of Pub. Invests. Arb. Bar Assoc. (PIABA 
Br.), at 9-10 (outlining FINRA rulemaking process).  
17 FINRA Rule 140 (Applicability); FINRA Bylaws, art IV, 
§ 1 (Membership); see, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 
F.3d at 648-49; Birkelbach v. S.E.C., 751 F.3d 472, 475 n.2 
(7th Cir. 2014); cf. Patten Sec. Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound 
& Genetics, Inc. (Patten), 819 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir. 1987), 
abrogated on other grounds. 
18 See 72 Fed. Reg. at 42,170.  FINRA’s predecessor 
SRO—i.e., the National Association of Securities Dealers, 
Inc. (NASD)—gained SEC approval of its revamped 
arbitration procedures decades ago.  Grunwald, 400 F.3d at 
1132; see Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 
220, 234 (1987).  NASD exercised this oversight role in 
conjunction with the regulatory arm of the New York Stock 
Exchange until July 2007, at which point they merged to form 
FINRA.  See 72 Fed. Reg. at 42,170.  
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important component of its investor protection mandate” and, 
since its inception, “has urged the SROs it regulates to 
provide an alternative dispute resolution forum for 
customers.”19  In furtherance of that mandate, FINRA now 
hosts the largest arbitration forum in the United States for 
resolving such disputes,20 which, according to FINRA and 
amicus, provides investors with a “fair, efficient and 
economical alternative to litigation.”21  To ensure that 
customers can benefit from arbitration, FINRA has 
promulgated numerous arbitration-related rules,22 including 
FINRA Rule 12200, which requires FINRA members to 
submit customer disputes to FINRA arbitration whenever a 
customer demands arbitration.23  Given the compulsory 
                                              
19 Jill I. Gross, The Customer’s Nonwaivable Right to 
Choose Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 10 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 383, 394 (2016) (detailing SEC’s 
support for securities arbitration); see McMahon, 482 U.S. at 
233 (recognizing SEC’s “expansive power to ensure the 
adequacy of arbitration procedures employed” by SROs).  
20 FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (FINRA), Final Report and 
Recommendations of the FINRA Dispute Resolution Task 
Force, at 1 (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.finra.org/sites/default
/files/Final-DR-task-force-report.pdf. 
21 FINRA, Reg. Notice 16-25, at 1 (July 2016); PIABA Br. 
at 12. 
22 These rules are set out in the FINRA Code of Arbitration 
Procedure for Customer Disputes (FINRA Arbitration Code).  
See FINRA Rules 12000-12905. 
23 FINRA Rule 12200 provides, in relevant part, that a 
FINRA member “must arbitrate a dispute” with one of its 
customers if (i) FINRA arbitration is “requested by the 
customer” or “required by written agreement,” and (ii) the 
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nature of the Rule, courts have held that, even in the absence 
of a written arbitration agreement, Rule 12200 constitutes a 
binding arbitration agreement between a FINRA member and 
customer.24    
 
A customer can initiate FINRA arbitration and invoke 
its arbitration rights under Rule 12200 by filing a “statement 
of claim” with the FINRA Director.25  Although Reading 
                                                                                                     
dispute “arises in connection with the business activities of 
the member.”  FINRA Rule 12200; see S.E.C., Reg. Notice 
08-57 (2008) (approving Rule 12200); see also Gross, supra 
note 19, at 396 (noting that brokerages have had a duty to 
arbitrate upon the demand of a customer since the 1800s). 
In July 2016, FINRA issued a regulatory notice, 
reminding its members “that customers have a right to request 
arbitration at FINRA’s arbitration forum at any time and do 
not forfeit that right under FINRA rules by signing any 
agreement with a forum selection provision specifying 
another dispute resolution process or an arbitration venue 
other than the FINRA arbitration forum.”  FINRA, Reg. 
Notice 16-25, at 1.    
24 See, e.g., Golden Empire, 764 F.3d at 214; Waterford Inv. 
Servs., Inc. v. Bosco, 682 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2012).  J.P. 
Morgan concedes that Reading is a “customer” within the 
meaning of FINRA Rule 12200.   
25 FINRA Rule 12302(a).  Once initiated, the arbitration is 
comprehensively governed by the FINRA Arbitration Code, 
which contemplates that the parties will submit to arbitration 
and comply with the Code.  Indeed, Rule 12212 permits an 
arbitration panel to “sanction a party for failure to comply 
with any provision of the Code,” and FINRA IM-12200 
provides that “[i]t may be deemed conduct inconsistent with 
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properly invoked its right to arbitrate by filing its statement of 
claim with FINRA, J.P. Morgan contends that it had no duty 
to arbitrate because Reading waived its rights under Rule 
12200 by agreeing to the forum-selection clauses.  It is 
against this backdrop that we consider the merits of the 
District Court’s order. 
DISCUSSION26 
In this appeal, we must answer two questions:  
(i) whether J.P. Morgan, as a FINRA member, is obligated to 
resolve Reading’s substantive claims through FINRA 
arbitration; and (ii) which court decides that question of 
arbitrability.  To answer those questions we must resolve the 
inherent tension between Reading’s right to arbitrate its 
claims pursuant to FINRA Rule 12200 and J.P. Morgan’s 
purported contractual right to litigate those same claims 
pursuant to the forum-selection clauses in the broker-dealer 
agreements.  Complicating this inquiry, the parties do not 
agree which of these questions must be resolved first; each 
side argues that the District Court lacked authority to resolve 
one of the two disputes at issue.   
 
We agree with J.P. Morgan that the transfer dispute, as 
a threshold question of venue, was properly resolved before 
the arbitrability dispute.  We thus begin by discussing 
                                                                                                     
just and equitable principles of trade . . . for a member . . . to: 
(a) fail to submit a dispute to arbitration under the Code as 
required by the Code.”  
26 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).   
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whether the District Court was required to transfer Reading’s 
declaratory judgment action to the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.     
I.  The District Court Properly Resolved the Transfer 
Dispute Before the Arbitrability Dispute  
When Reading filed its single-count, declaratory 
judgment action in the District Court, the only merits issue 
before the court was whether FINRA Rule 12200 required 
J.P. Morgan to submit to FINRA arbitration.  However, once 
J.P. Morgan moved to transfer that action, the District Court 
was presented with a threshold issue regarding the propriety 
of the venue in which Reading filed its action to compel 
arbitration—namely, whether the declaratory judgment action 
should be transferred to New York in light of the forum-
selection clauses.  The parties spill much ink on which of 
these two issues should be resolved first.  In J.P. Morgan’s 
view, the transfer dispute must be resolved first and, since the 
District Court was required to transfer the action, it lacked 
authority to resolve the arbitrability dispute.  By contrast, 
Reading argues that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
required the District Court to enforce FINRA Rule 12200 by 
compelling arbitration and, therefore, the court was divested 
of its discretion to transfer.  The District Court declined to 
transfer the case before turning to the question of arbitrability.  
We agree that threshold disputes over venue and jurisdiction 
should be resolved before merits disputes.  Thus, we conclude 
that the District Court’s sequence of decision-making was not 
only permissible, but also preferable.  
 
In In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp, we endorsed the 
view that district courts have “discretion to address 
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convenience-based venue issues” in the first instance and that 
they “should suspend concerns about other threshold issues” 
while doing so.27  That view is supported by the principle that 
federal courts have flexibility to choose among alternate 
“grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.”28  For 
instance, the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of a 
district court to dismiss an action under the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, without first determining whether the action 
should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.29  The Court 
granted such leeway to district courts because a forum non 
conveniens dismissal—much like the parties’ dispute over 
transfer30—is a “nonmerits issue” that “does not entail any 
assumption by the court of substantive law-declaring 
power.”31  Venue disputes involve only a threshold 
determination “that the merits should [or should not] be 
                                              
27 867 F.3d 390, 404 n.8 (3d Cir. 2017); see In re 
LimitNone, LLC, 551 F.3d 572, 576-78 (7th Cir. 2008).      
28 Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 
U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil 
Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)).   
29 Id. at 436; see Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 
173, 180 (1979) (permitting courts to address venue before 
personal jurisdiction). 
30 See Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the 
W. Dist. of Texas (Alt. Marine), 571 U.S. 49, 60 (2013) 
(explaining federal transfer statute “is merely a codification 
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens for the subset of 
cases in which the transferee forum is within the federal court 
system”).   
31 Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 433 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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adjudicated elsewhere.”32  By contrast, resolving a dispute 
over arbitrability requires a district court to apply its law-
declaring power regarding the parties’ right to arbitrate.  This 
determination may be frustrated if the threshold issue of 
venue is not decided first.   
 
Moreover, resolving merits disputes at the outset, 
without first ensuring that venue is proper, would in certain 
cases nullify the very right afforded by the forum-section 
clause—i.e., the right to resolve the merits in a contractually 
designated forum.33  In addition, ensuring venue is proper 
before turning to the merits promotes finality interests and 
judicial economy by ensuring the facial validity of any 
subsequent order compelling (or denying) arbitration.34  Such 
concerns are alleviated, however, by resolving threshold 
challenges to venue before secondary disputes over 
arbitrability.  
 
The District Court, confronted with a plaintiff seeking 
to compel arbitration and a defendant moving to transfer the 
action to compel arbitration based on a forum-selection 
clause, properly addressed the transfer question before the 
question of arbitrability.  We will turn then to the propriety of 
the denial of the motion to transfer. 
                                              
32 Id. at 432.  
33 See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63-64; see also Puleo v. 
Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 178 (3d Cir. 2010) (en 
banc).      
34 See, e.g., Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 883 
(3d Cir. 1995) (vacating a district court’s order denying a 
motion to compel arbitration after concluding that the court 
erred by failing to transfer the action to another district). 
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II.  The District Court Properly Declined to Transfer 
Reading’s Action to Compel Arbitration  
A. The Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic 
Marine does not require transfer. 
J.P. Morgan moved to transfer Reading’s declaratory 
judgment action, arguing that the Supreme Court’s transfer 
framework announced in Atlantic Marine required the District 
Court to enforce the forum-selection clause by transferring 
the action to the Southern District of New York.  The court 
disagreed that the forum-selection clause required transfer 
because, in its view, the clause does “not establish the judicial 
forum” in which Reading “must compel arbitration.”35  In 
response to that ruling, J.P. Morgan asked us to determine, on 
interlocutory review, whether Atlantic Marine requires a 
district court to enforce a forum-selection clause by 
transferring a declaratory judgment action to compel 
arbitration, even if the district court concludes that the clause 
does not encompass the underlying arbitration.36  In other 
words, the question instructs us to assume that even if 
Reading’s declaratory judgment action and statement of claim 
filed with FINRA fall outside the scope of the forum-
selection clause, nevertheless Atlantic Marine required 
transfer.   
 
 Absent a forum-selection clause, a district court 
ordinarily assesses whether to transfer a case to another 
federal district by considering the factors set out in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a), including “various public-interest considerations” 
                                              
35 J.A. 3.  
36 J.A. 5, 348, 350; see supra note 12 and corresponding 
text for certified question.  
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and the private interests of the parties to the litigation.37  In 
Atlantic Marine, however, the Supreme Court explained that 
the presence of a forum-selection clause alters the traditional 
analysis in several respects.38  Most significantly, a court 
considering a “motion to transfer based on a forum-selection 
clause should not consider arguments about the parties’ 
private interests,” since forum-selection provisions 
“represent[] the parties’ agreement as to the most proper 
forum.”39  As a result, when a court is confronted with a valid 
forum-selection clause that covers the dispute, it must 
consider only the public-interest factors and “deem the 
private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor the 
preselected forum.”40  For these reasons, the Atlantic Marine 
Court held that when a party invokes a forum-selection clause 
to transfer an action under § 1404(a), “a district court should 
transfer the case unless extraordinary circumstances unrelated 
to the convenience of the parties clearly disfavor transfer.”41 
 
Focusing on these words, J.P. Morgan contends that 
the District Court had to transfer this action because no 
extraordinary circumstances are present.  But a central 
                                              
37 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (allowing a district court to transfer a 
civil action to another district—in which the case could have 
been brought or to which the parties have consented—“[f]or 
the convenience of parties and witnesses” and “in the interest 
of justice”); see Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62-63; Jumara, 55 
F.3d at 879.  
38 Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62-63 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).     
39 Id. at 63-64 (internal citation omitted).  
40 Id. at 64.  
41 Id. at 52.  
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premise of J.P. Morgan’s reliance on Atlantic Marine—and 
the requirement that district courts honor the parties’ 
contractual choice of forum in all but extraordinary 
circumstances—is that Reading’s action to compel arbitration 
falls within the scope of the forum-selection clauses.  Nothing 
in Atlantic Marine disturbs the long-standing body of law 
clarifying that a court need not transfer an action based on a 
forum-selection clause if the clause is invalid (i.e., an 
enforceability challenge) or if it does not cover the action or 
claims that the defendant is seeking to transfer (i.e., a scope 
challenge).42  Rather, the transfer framework announced in 
Atlantic Marine presupposes the existence of an action that 
falls within the scope of a valid forum-selection clause.43  
                                              
42 See, e.g., Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176, 181 
(3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that questions regarding the scope 
of a forum-selection clause are “analytically distinct” from 
questions regarding that clause’s enforceability); Cottman 
Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 293 (3d Cir. 
1994); see also John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp. 
(John Wyeth), 119 F.3d 1070, 1075 (3d Cir. 1997).   
43 Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62 n.5; see, e.g., Mary Kay, Inc., 
874 F.3d at 186 (applying the forum non convenience 
framework only after “[h]aving concluded that [the 
plaintiff’s] claim falls within the scope of the . . . enforceable 
forum selection clauses”).  The forum-selection clause at 
issue in Atlantic Marine provided that “all disputes between 
the parties shall be litigated” in a specific forum. 571 U.S. at 
53 (internal quotation marks omitted).  By the time the case 
reached the Supreme Court, it was undisputed that the 
litigation between the parties fell within the scope of the 
forum-selection clauses.  See Br. for Resp., Atl. Marine, 571 
U.S. 49 (No. 12-929), 2013 WL 4495148, at *6 (conceding 
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This conclusion answers the question we certified for 
interlocutory review:  
 
[Does] . . . Atlantic Marine . . . require[] a 
district court to enforce a forum selection clause 
by transferring a declaratory action seeking to 
compel arbitration, even if the district court 
determines that the forum selection clause does 
not cover the underlying arbitration that the 
plaintiff seeks to compel.   
The answer is, “No, it does not.”  If a party invokes a forum-
selection clause to transfer an action—here, Reading’s action 
to compel arbitration—but the district court concludes that 
the action does not fall within the scope of the clause, the 
traditional § 1404(a) framework applies, not the framework 
set forth in Atlantic Marine.  
 
Accordingly, the District Court was required to apply 
Atlantic Marine and transfer the action to New York only if 
Reading’s declaratory judgment action fell within the scope 
of the forum-selection clause.  
                                                                                                     
that the parties’ agreement favored transferring the case); Br. 
for Pet., Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. 49 (No. 12-929), 2013 WL 
3166391, at *4 (noting that the party resisting transfer “does 
not dispute that its claims against Atlantic Marine fall within 
the scope of the mandatory forum selection clause”). 
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B. Reading’s action to compel arbitration does not 
fall within the scope of the forum-selection 
clause. 
A scope-based challenge to the applicability of a 
forum-selection clause presents a quintessential question of 
contract interpretation.44  We have stressed that “whether or 
not a forum selection clause applies” to a particular dispute 
“depends on what the specific clause at issue says.”45  The 
forum-selection clause in the 2005 and 2007 broker-dealer 
agreements provides that “all actions and proceedings arising 
out of this Broker-Dealer Agreement or any of the 
transactions contemplated hereby shall be brought in the 
United States District Court in the County of New York.”46  
J.P. Morgan maintains that the District Court was required to 
transfer the case because Reading’s petition to compel 
arbitration is an “action . . . arising out of” the broker-dealer 
agreements and the related ARS offerings.  Reading counters 
that the action “arise[s] out of” FINRA Rule 12200—not the 
broker-dealer agreements or related transactions—and 
therefore the District Court appropriately denied the motion 
to transfer.  We agree with Reading.  
                                              
44 We exercise plenary review over legal questions relating 
to “[t]he interpretation and enforcement of a forum selection 
clause,” which includes the District Court’s order denying 
J.P. Morgan’s motion to transfer.  Salovaara v. Jackson Nat. 
Life Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 2001); Jumara, 55 
F.3d at 880-81. 
45 John Wyeth, 119 F.3d at 1075; Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 
at 180-81. 
46 J.A. 95, 120.   
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 We begin with the meaning of the phrase “arising out 
of” in the forum-selection clauses.  Because we have 
admonished that “[d]rawing analogy to other cases is useful 
only to the extent those other cases address contract language 
that is the same or substantially similar to that at issue,”47 we 
look to the decisions of our sister circuit courts of appeals that 
have construed the phrase “arising out of” in a forum-
selection clause.48  In Coregis Insurance Co. v. American 
Health Foundation, Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
defined the phrase in accordance with its ordinary meaning:  
“To ‘arise’ out of means ‘to originate from a specified 
source.’”49  In a subsequent decision, Phillips v. Audio Active 
Ltd., the Second Circuit rejected the overbroad contention 
that the phrase arising out of “encompass[es] all claims that 
have some possible relationship with the contract, including 
claims that may only ‘relate to,’ be ‘associated with,’ or ‘arise 
                                              
47 John Wyeth, 119 F.3d at 1075.   
48 Although we have held that state law governs the 
interpretation of a forum-selection clause in a diversity suit, 
see Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d at 181-83, the parties have 
waived any choice-of-law issue by failing to address it in 
their briefs and by relying on cases that apply different bodies 
of law than that designated in the broker-dealer agreements’ 
New York choice-of-law clauses.  See Williams v. BASF 
Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2014); see also 
John Wyeth, 119 F.3d at 1074. 
49 241 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Webster’s 
Third New Int’l Dictionary 117 (1986)); see, e.g., United 
States v. Husmann, 765 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We 
look to dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary 
meaning of a word.”).  
 23 
in connection with’ the contract.”50  Likewise, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that “courts have 
resisted the siren call of” equating the term “arising out of” 
with the concept of but-for causation.51  We agree that 
“arising out of” in a forum-selection clause should be 
interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of that 
phrase—i.e., to originate from a specified source.  
Interpreting a forum-selection clause in accordance with its 
                                              
50 494 F.3d 378, 389-91 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e approve of 
the approach outlined by the Third Circuit, which highlights 
the language-specific nature of this inquiry and discounts the 
precedential weight of cases that deal with dissimilarly 
worded clauses.” (citing John Wyeth, 119 F.3d at 1075)).  We 
agree that the phrase “arising out of” is narrower in scope 
than other clauses we have addressed, such as those 
encompassing all actions “arising in connection with,” 
“relating to,” or “with respect to” an agreement.  See, e.g., 
John Wyeth, 119 F.3d at 1075 (observing that “the phrase 
‘arising in relation to’ is broader than ‘arising under’”); see 
Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Moonmouth Co. SA, 779 F.3d 214, 
217-20 (3d Cir. 2015) (construing broadly forum-selection 
clause covering all disputes arising “with respect” to an 
agreement); Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d at 179 (addressing 
clause covering any “dispute or controversy [that] arises 
between [the parties] concerning any matter relating to this 
Agreement”).   
51 Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exports Ltd., 28 
F.3d 600, 602 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[B]ut for the existence of 
federal drug safety standards, it would not be possible to 
contend that noncompliance with the standards is tortious, but 
it does not follow that a tort suit ‘arises under’ those standards 
and thus activates federal jurisdiction.”). 
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plain meaning comports with well-established principles of 
interpretation.52  And, as in Phillips, we see “no reason to 
presume the parties meant anything other than the dictionary 
definition of the term.”53   
 
 The propriety of transfer thus turns on the following 
inquiry:  Is Reading’s declaratory judgment action to compel 
arbitration—not to be mistaken with the separate action it 
filed with FINRA—an action or proceeding that originates 
from the broker-dealer agreements or the related ARS 
offerings?  In answering that question, we are again guided by 
Phillips.  There, the court held that a plaintiff’s federal 
copyright “claims d[id] not arise out of” a recording contract 
because those claims did not involve an assertion of the 
plaintiff’s “rights or duties under that contract.”54  Instead, the 
claims arose out of the Copyright Act.  Likewise, here, 
Reading’s action to compel FINRA arbitration does not “arise 
out of” the broker-dealer agreements because Reading’s sole 
claim for declaratory relief does not involve an assertion of 
Reading’s contractual “rights or duties.”55  The only right 
Reading seeks to enforce in its complaint is its right to 
arbitrate its claims against J.P. Morgan.  That right does not 
originate from the broker-dealer agreements, but rather from 
FINRA Rule 12200, which gives Reading the right to demand 
                                              
52 See, e.g., Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Wyndham Worldwide 
Operations, Inc., 653 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2011); Great 
Am. Ins. Co. v. Norwin Sch. Dist., 544 F.3d 229, 243 (3d Cir. 
2008); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 
(1981). 
53 494 F.3d at 390. 
54 Phillips, 494 F.3d at 390-92.   
55 See, e.g., J.A. 14, ¶ 3; J.A. 15 ¶¶ 5, 10; J.A. 21, ¶¶ 36-40.  
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FINRA arbitration and imposes a corresponding duty on J.P. 
Morgan to arbitrate.56  Because the sole source for Reading’s 
right to arbitrate is FINRA Rule 12200—without which 
Reading would not be entitled to compel arbitration, and J.P. 
Morgan would not have a duty to arbitrate—Reading’s 
declaratory judgment action does not “arise out of” the 
broker-dealer agreements.   
 
The broker-dealer agreements come into play only 
because J.P. Morgan has invoked the forum-selection clauses 
in those agreements as a defense to Reading’s declaratory 
judgment action.  “The answer to the question whether a 
‘defense’ based on a contract that contains a forum selection 
clause implicates that clause depends on the language of the 
clause.”57  Where, as here, the clause encompasses only 
disputes “arising out of” the contract, courts have rejected the 
argument that a contractual defense alone is sufficient to 
bring the dispute within the scope of the clause.58  We 
therefore decline J.P. Morgan’s invitation to expand the scope 
                                              
56 J.P. Morgan urges that Reading’s declaratory judgment 
action falls within the scope of the forum-selection clauses 
because Reading’s complaint explicitly refers to the broker-
dealer agreements.  But those references alone, which merely 
contextualize the parties’ dispute over arbitrability, do not 
establish that the petition to compel arbitration “aris[es] out 
of” those agreements.  See, e.g., Phillips, 494 F.3d at 390-91.  
57 John Wyeth, 119 F.3d at 1076. 
58 See, e.g., Phillips, 494 F.3d at 391; Omron Healthcare, 
Inc., 28 F.3d at 601-02; Rovi Guides, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 
2016 WL 6217201, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2016) (citing 
cases); see also John Wyeth, 119 F.3d at 1076 n.5.      
 26 
of the forum-selection clause, under the guise of interpreting 
it, to encompass a contractual defense.59 
 
Because Reading’s declaratory judgment action to 
compel arbitration is not one “arising out of” the broker-
dealer agreements, it does not fall within the scope of the 
forum-selection clause.  We will therefore affirm the District 
Court’s order denying J.P. Morgan’s motion to transfer the 
action to the Southern District of New York.60     
                                              
59 J.P. Morgan argues for the first time in its reply brief that 
the agreements are not relevant only as a defense “because 
they create the customer relationship between” the parties and 
are therefore the “source” of Reading’s arbitration demand.  
Reply. Br. at 6.  J.P. Morgan waived this argument, however, 
by failing to present it in the District Court and by presenting 
it to this court only in passing.  See, e.g., John Wyeth, 119 
F.3d at 1076 n.6 (citing Commonwealth of Pa. v. HHS, 101 
F.3d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1996)).  And, in any event, we decline 
to accept this argument—i.e., the view that but-for the 
customer relationship created by the agreements Reading 
would have no right to arbitrate—because it improperly 
equates the meaning of “arising out of” with the concept of 
but-for causation.  See  Omron Healthcare, Inc., 28 F.3d at 
602.    
60 We note, however, our disagreement with certain aspects 
of the District Court’s rationale for declining to transfer the 
action.  Instead of examining the language of the forum-
selection clauses and asking whether Reading’s action fell 
within their scope, as required by our case law, John Wyeth, 
119 F.3d at 1075-76, the District Court denied transfer based 
entirely on our decision in Patten Securities Corporation v. 
Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 
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III.  The District Court Properly Required J.P. Morgan 
to Submit to FINRA Arbitration Because the 
Forum-Selection Clause Did Not Waive Reading’s 
Right to Arbitrate Under FINRA Rule 12200 
Having concluded that the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania was an appropriate venue in which to resolve 
the arbitrability dispute, we must decide whether to affirm the 
court’s order requiring J.P. Morgan to submit to FINRA 
arbitration.61  This question requires us to reconcile the two 
competing rights at stake.  On the one hand, FINRA Rule 
12200 grants Reading the right to resolve its substantive 
claims against J.P. Morgan through FINRA arbitration.62  On 
the other hand, the forum-selection clause grants to J.P. 
Morgan the contractual right to litigate those claims.  Unlike 
Reading’s petition to compel arbitration, the statement of 
                                                                                                     
1987).  See J.A. 3 (Dist. Ct. Op.).  But the forum-selection 
clause at issue in Patten is materially different than the 
clauses at issue here.  Patten, 819 F.2d at 407 n.3.  And, 
unlike here, Patten did not involve any threshold question of 
transfer, since the petition to enjoin arbitration at issue in 
Patten had been filed in the contractually designated forum.    
61 We review the court’s order compelling arbitration de 
novo, as it presents a question of law.  See Century Indem. 
Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d 
513, 521 (3d Cir. 2009); Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 
376 (3d Cir. 2007). 
62 Numerous courts have held that FINRA Rule 12200 
constitutes an enforceable arbitration agreement within the 
meaning of the FAA.  See, e.g., Golden Empire, 764 F.3d at 
214; Bosco, 682 F.3d at 353; Berthel Fisher & Co. Fin. 
Servs., Inc. v. Larmon, 695 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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claim Reading filed with FINRA qualifies as an “action [or] 
proceeding . . . arising out of” the broker-dealer agreements 
and related ARS transactions.63   
 
Attempts to reconcile the tension between a broker-
dealer’s right to litigate pursuant to a forum-selection clause 
and a customer’s corresponding right to arbitrate under 
FINRA Rule 12200 have divided our sister circuit courts.  
The Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held 
that a materially identical forum-selection clause requires the 
parties to litigate in federal court,64 while the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has held that Rule 12200 requires the 
parties to arbitrate, notwithstanding the presence of a forum-
selection clause.65  We agree with the Fourth Circuit that the 
forum-selection clauses in the broker-dealer agreements are 
insufficient to waive Reading’s right to arbitrate under 
FINRA Rule 12200.   
                                              
63 Although several courts have read the phrase “all actions 
and proceedings” as limited to judicial proceedings, not 
arbitrations, see, e.g., UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 
706 F.3d 319, 329-30 (4th Cir. 2013), Reading does not press 
that argument here.  And that narrow interpretation of the 
terms “actions” and “proceedings” conflicts with the ordinary 
meaning of those terms.  See Golden Empire, 764 F.3d at 216.  
64 Golden Empire, 764 F.3d at 214-17; City of Reno, 747 
F.3d at 741-47; see also Presbyterian Healthcare Servs. v. 
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 122 F. Supp. 3d 1157 (D.N.M. 2015).   
65 Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 329-30; see also COR 
Clearing, LLC v. Jarvis, 2014 WL 98799, at *7 (D. Neb. Jan. 
9, 2014); UBS Sec. LLC v. Allina Health Sys., 2013 WL 
500373, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 11, 2013).   
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On one side of the divide, both the Second Circuit (in 
Golden Empire) and the Ninth Circuit (in City of Reno) have 
held that “a forum selection clause requiring ‘all actions and 
proceedings’ to be brought in federal court supersedes an 
earlier agreement to arbitrate” embodied in FINRA Rule 
12200.66  Treating Rule 12200 as a mere “default obligation” 
to arbitrate, the Ninth Circuit reasoned (over a dissent) that 
the customer “clearly and unambiguously disclaimed any 
right it might otherwise have had to FINRA arbitration” when 
it assented to the forum-selection clause.67  The Second 
Circuit likewise viewed the issue as “whether an arbitration 
agreement remains in force in light of a later-executed 
agreement,”68 concluding that the forum-selection clause in 
                                              
66 Golden Empire, 764 F.3d at 215; see City of Reno, 747 
F.3d at 747.  This rationale presumes that FINRA Rule 12200 
imposes a mere contractual duty on J.P. Morgan to arbitrate.  
Conflating a duty imposed by regulation with one imposed by 
contract, however, overlooks that FINRA Rule 12200 was 
adopted pursuant to authority delegated by Congress under 
the Exchange Act and approved by the SEC.  Because FINRA 
Rule 12200 imposes on broker-dealers a federal regulatory 
duty to arbitrate and confers on customers a regulatory right 
to arbitrate, it differs significantly in kind from private 
contractual arbitration agreements.  See FINRA, Reg. Notice 
16-25, at 5.   
67 City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 743. But see id. at 748-49 
(Battaglia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (rejecting 
view that the forum-selection clause was sufficiently specific 
to supersede, displace, or waive the right to arbitrate under 
FINRA Rule 12200).  
68 Even if Rule 12200 is the functional equivalent of a 
private contract, this analysis presumes that the “agreement to 
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that agreement “supersede[d] the background FINRA 
arbitration rule.”69  These courts accordingly concluded that 
the forum-selection clauses were controlling and the parties 
were required to litigate their dispute.   
 
On the other side of the divide, the Fourth Circuit (in 
Carilion Clinic) rejected the contention that the forum-
selection clause operated to waive a customer’s right to 
arbitrate under FINRA Rule 12200.70  The court began with 
the principle that an agreement waives the right to arbitrate 
only if it is “sufficiently specific to impute to the contracting 
parties the reasonable expectation that they are superseding, 
displacing, or waiving the arbitration obligation created by 
                                                                                                     
arbitrate” embodied in FINRA Rule 12200 predates the 
execution of the broker-dealer agreements.  That position is 
hard to reconcile with the fact that an investor’s right to 
demand arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 stems from its 
status as a “customer,” a status that J.P. Morgan contends is 
created by the broker-dealer agreements.  Reply Br. at 6.  J.P. 
Morgan’s position in that regard implies that the agreement to 
arbitrate under Rule 12200 comes into existence only after 
the parties executed the broker-dealer agreements, not 
beforehand, which contradicts the notion that the agreements 
are somehow later-in-time agreements that “superseded” or 
“displaced” Rule 12200.  See Gross, supra note 19, at 400-
401.    
69 Golden Empire, 764 F.3d at 216.  
70 Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 328-30; see also City of 
Reno, 747 F.3d at 754 (Battaglia, J., dissenting); UBS Sec. 
LLC v. Allina Health Sys., 2013 WL 500373, at *1 (D. Minn. 
Feb. 11, 2013). 
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FINRA Rule 12200.”71  Although the court acknowledged 
that “the obligation to arbitrate under FINRA Rule 12200 can 
be superseded and displaced by a more specific agreement 
between the parties,” it still concluded that the forum-
selection clause was not such an agreement, as it was entirely 
silent on the issue of arbitration.72  Thus, the court held that 
the customer had not waived its right to arbitrate and that the 
broker-dealer had to submit to FINRA arbitration.73   
                                              
71 Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 328-29 (citing cases).  This 
principle generally aligns with our waiver precedent.  See 
Patten, 819 F.2d at 406-07. 
72 Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 328. But see Golden Empire, 
764 F.3d at 215 (agreeing that the forum selection clause 
must “specifically preclude[]” arbitration, but disagreeing that 
the clause must actually mention arbitration to do so). 
73 In July 2016, FINRA issued a regulatory notice, 
disagreeing with the reasoning of Golden Empire and City of 
Reno and reminding its members “that customers have a right 
to request arbitration at FINRA’s arbitration forum at any 
time and do not forfeit that right under FINRA rules by 
signing any agreement with a forum selection provision 
specifying another dispute resolution process or an arbitration 
venue other than the FINRA arbitration forum.”  FINRA, 
Reg. Notice 16-25, at 1.  FINRA concluded that “any member 
firm’s denial, limitation or attempt to deny or limit a 
customer’s right to request FINRA arbitration, even if the 
customer seeks to exercise that right after having agreed to a 
forum selection clause specifying a venue other than a 
FINRA arbitration forum, would violate FINRA Rules 2268 
and 12200.”  Id.  Nothing in this Opinion precludes FINRA 
from sanctioning one of its members for attempting to avoid 
its duty to arbitrate via contract.  See FINRA Rule 12212 
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We agree with the Fourth Circuit that the question is 
one of waiver, and that the forum-selection clauses did not 
implicitly waive Reading’s right to FINRA arbitration.    This 
conclusion stems in part from our decision in Patten, where 
we had to determine whether a broker-dealer agreement 
containing a provision in which the parties consented to the 
jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts implicitly waived the 
customer’s right to arbitration under NASD’s compulsory 
arbitration rule (i.e., the progenitor of Rule 12200).74  We 
rejected such an expansive view of waiver by relying on two 
well-established principles.  First, we explained that a “party 
signing a waiver must know what rights it is waiving.”75  
Second, we invoked the strong federal policy, embodied in 
the FAA, favoring arbitration whenever doubts arise as to 
whether a dispute is arbitrable.76   Because the forum-
                                                                                                     
(permitting an arbitration panel to “sanction a party for failure 
to comply with any provision of the Code”); FINRA IM-
12200 (providing that “[i]t may be deemed conduct 
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade and a 
violation of Rule 2010 for a member . . . to: (a) fail to submit 
a dispute to arbitration under the Code as required by the 
Code”); see also FINRA, Reg. Notice 16-25, at 5 (“FINRA 
Rules. . . . are not default rules that may be overridden by 
more specific or separate contractual terms without 
consequences under FINRA rules.”).   
74 Patten, 819 F.2d at 406-07 (characterizing the issue as 
“whether a forum selection clause is a waiver of NASD 
arbitration”).  NASD is FINRA’s predecessor SRO. 
75 Id. at 407. 
76 Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)); see Ehleiter v. 
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selection clause in Patten was silent as to the issue of 
arbitration, raising doubts about whether the parties’ had 
waived arbitration and whether the dispute was arbitrable, we 
held that it was insufficient to waive the customer’s right to 
arbitrate under NASD rules.77     
 
Although Patten involved a forum-selection clause 
with permissive language,78 its reasoning leads us to the same 
conclusion here:  Reading did not waive its right to arbitrate 
by agreeing to the broker-dealer agreements.  As in Patten, 
we begin by noting that any reference to arbitration is 
“[c]onspicuously absent from” the forum-selection clauses.  
Without a specific reference to arbitration, the forum-
selection clause requiring parties to litigate actions “arising 
out of” the contract and related transactions lacks the 
specificity required to advise Reading that it was waiving its 
affirmative right to arbitrate under FINRA 12200.79  Indeed, 
the Fourth Circuit stressed in Carilion Clinic that “[n]o word 
even suggesting supersedence, waiver, or preclusion [of the 
                                                                                                     
Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 216 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Gay, 511 F.3d at 394. 
77 Id.; see Personal Sec. & Safety Sys. Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 
297 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2002) (similar). 
78 Patten, 819 F.2d at 406-07.  The provision provided that 
“the Company hereby consents and will submit to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the State of New Jersey and of 
any federal court sitting in the State of New Jersey with 
respect to controversies arising under this Agreement.”  Id. at 
407 n.3.  
79 Id. at 407 (“A party signing a waiver must know what 
rights it is waiving.”).     
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right to arbitrate] exists” in the forum-selection clause.80  As 
we explained in Patten, had J.P. Morgan wanted Reading to 
waive its right to arbitrate, it should “have made a reference 
to arbitration” in either the waiver provision or forum-
selection provisions of the broker-dealer agreements.81   
 
Finally, we are reluctant to find an implied waiver 
here.  Reading’s right to arbitrate is not contractual in nature, 
but rather arises out of a binding, regulatory rule that has been 
adopted by FINRA and approved by the SEC.  By condoning 
an implicit waiver of Reading’s regulatory right to arbitrate, 
we would erode investors’ ability to use an efficient and cost-
effective means of resolving allegations of misconduct in the 
brokerage industry and thus undermine FINRA’s ability to 
regulate, oversee, and remedy any such misconduct.82  In so 
holding, we split with some of our sister circuits, but begin 
                                              
80 706 F.3d at 330.     
81 See Patten, 819 F.2d at 406-07. 
82 As FINRA has observed, enforcing purported contractual 
waivers of the right to arbitrate under FINRA rules would 
impermissibly permit “FINRA member firms to deny 
investors the benefits of FINRA’s arbitration program, which 
may, as a practical matter, foreclose customers from asserting 
their claims, particularly small claims.”  FINRA, Reg. Notice 
16-25, at 4.  And as amicus explains in its brief, if “brokerage 
firms are allowed to selectively and unilaterally force certain 
customers into court, the increased time and cost of going to 
court will most certainly result in brokerage firms avoiding 
otherwise meritorious claims.”  PIABA Br. at 23. 
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the process of closing this contractual loophole to FINRA’s 
compulsory arbitration rule.83  
 
The District Court properly concluded that, under 
FINRA Rule 12200, J.P. Morgan is required to arbitrate 
Reading’s claims regarding the ARS offerings.84   
                                              
83 Given this conclusion, we need not address whether an 
explicit waiver of the right to arbitrate would be invalid and 
unenforceable under Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act, as 
amicus and Reading argue.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) 
(providing that any contractual “provision binding any person 
to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of 
any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-
regulatory organization, shall be void” (emphasis added)); S. 
REP. NO. 111-176, at 114 (2010) (amending the Act to ensure 
“equal treatment for the rules of all SROs under Section 
29(a)”); see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228-30; Gross, supra 
note 19, at 388.     
84 J.P. Morgan also argues that the District Court lacked 
authority to compel arbitration because Section 4 of the FAA 
limits the power of district courts “to order arbitration outside 
of the district,” Econo-Car Intern., Inc. v. Antilles Car 
Rentals, Inc., 499 F.2d 1391, 1394 (3d Cir. 1974); but FINRA 
has not yet selected the location of the arbitration hearing.  
J.A. 199.  In fact, courts have read those geographical 
limitations into the FAA in cases “where the arbitration 
agreement contains a forum selection clause.” Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lauer, 49 F.3d 323, 327 (7th 
Cir. 1995); see Econo-Car Intern., Inc., 499 F.2d at 1394.  
J.P. Morgan provides no support for the proposition that those 
limitations apply here where the “arbitration agreement” at 
issue is a regulatory rule, not a contract containing a forum-
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CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order, declining to transfer Reading’s declaratory judgment 
action and compelling J.P. Morgan to submit to FINRA 
arbitration.   
                                                                                                     
selection clause.  Moreover, we have no reason to believe that 
the District Court would compel the parties to arbitration 
outside of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  FINRA Rule 
12213(a)(1) provides that the arbitration hearing generally 
will be held at “the hearing location closest to the customer’s 
residence at the time of the events giving rise to the 
dispute”—i.e., FINRA District 9 in Philadelphia, PA.  Given 
the substantial likelihood that the hearing will be held within 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the District Court did 
not exceed its authority by issuing an order that merely 
“directed [the parties] to arbitrate their dispute under the 
provisions of [the FINRA Arbitration Code].”  J.A. 4.  
